


THE WAR IN SPAIN

By Louis Fischer



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I. THE CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR

1. THE SOCIAL CLEAVAGE

THE present military insurrection against the legitimate Spanish government is an attempt to destroy those forces which have undertaken to make Spain a modern, progressive nation.

Not so long ago Spain ruled parts of the United States and large territories to the south of it. Spanish explorers and conquerors had pushed into the seven seas carrying Spanish influence and culture with them. Spain was mistress of vast domains, a mighty and wealthy power. Since then she has sunk to the level of a third-rate nation. Her people are as enterprising as in the heyday of her glory. Her geographical position on the Atlantic and Mediterranean is as strategic and favorable. Her natural resources are greater than those of Italy. Yet she has become a miserably poor, backward, unhappy country. Somebody must be responsible for this stagnation and retrogression. It must be the people who have ruled Spain in recent centuries. And those very ruling classes were the initiators and are now the backbone of the revolt against the Madrid government. While England made the Industrial Revolution and France her great political revolution, the landlords of Spain refused to let the clock go forward. In many respects Spain is still medieval, the Czarist Russia of 1937.

The bloodless overthrow of the monarchy in 1931 was an effort to expel the Middle Ages and to introduce the twentieth century into Spain. The enlightened bourgeoisie, the intellectuals, the workingmen, and the peasants banded together to rid the country of the incubus of medievalism. But though the physically subnormal and mentally disintegrated House of Bourbon, incapable of the slightest resistance, allowed itself to be swept into the dustbin of history, the republic was too weak, perhaps because too indecisive, to dislodge the social stratum on which the monarchy had rested. The feudal barons accepted the form of the republic in order the better to destroy its content. They obstructed every reform which might have dissipated social unrest and raised the standard of living. The most burning need was the alleviation of the lot of the peasants,

who were serfs in fact if not in name. I visited Andalusian villages in 1934 where no peasant owned land. Whole farming communities had not a single horse or cow or sheep or pig. In the village of Pueblo del Rio, half an hour from the much-advertised tourist city of Seville, a peasant said to me: "I ate my cat today and it was the first time I had tasted meat in six months." The farmers lived in mud huts with earthen floors and no tables. Indeed, tables would have been totally superfluous, for they never sat down to a meal. They subsisted on an unvaried diet of lentils, black sugarless coffee, and bread. Tens of thousands of Spanish peasants have for decades lived in a state of semi-starvation. Whole villages feed on boiled grasses and roots. As one moves through the countryside, one can see hundreds of families in cave dwellings. Those are their permanent homes. It is a well-known fact that this low, almost animal existence has reduced many country folk to the mental level of cretins and morons.

The republic came into being to alter these conditions. It found Spain 72 per cent agricultural—a token of underdevelopment and backwardness. It was a country of idle rich and idle poor, of big landlords and poverty-stricken peasants. One per cent of the population owned 51.5 per cent of its soil, whereas 40 per cent owned no land at all.

In the June, 1925, issue of the *International Labor Review*, Dr. Fernando de los Rios, later Spanish Ambassador to the United States, published the results of his investigations into agrarian conditions in the entire registration area, which covers one-third of Spain. In Galicia, he wrote, the peasantry "is not simply poor but almost destitute." This province, with an area of 2,900,000 hectares, counted 2,500,000 holdings, little more than one hectare per family, whereas between ten and twelve hectares are required to support a family. The registration area of 17,000,000 hectares was divided into 6,130,000 holdings—about three hectares per farm—but 514 landowners in the province of Caceres owned 566,415 hectares.

The spread between the upper and lower classes was vast. Millions had not even a tiny patch for the cultivation of potatoes, but in 1936 the Duke of Medinaceli owned 195,680 acres, the Duke of Penaranda 104,345 acres, the Duke of Alba 89,625 acres, the Marquis de Comillas 42,795 acres, the Duke of Lerma 25,560 acres, and so on down a long list of titled and untitled landowners who received sufficient income from their ill-managed estates to lead

luxurious lives in Madrid or Paris or London while the hired labor on their lands eked out a humiliating existence. In several provinces of Spain laws existed which prohibited the use of machinery. With plenty of water in rivers and whole provinces requiring irrigation, nothing was done to introduce it. **MENTIRA!**

History assigned to the Spanish Republic the task of removing the taboo on progress. It had to increase agricultural output, making the farmer a bigger consumer of city goods and thus stimulating the growth of domestic industries. By solving the land problem Spain could become an advanced and prosperous nation.

2. REACTION FIGHTS THE REPUBLIC

These matters were urgent. Yet the Republicans proceeded slowly and cautiously. They were aware of the opposition they would meet from the landlords. I discussed this question in March, 1934, with Manuel Azaña, who had been Prime Minister of Spain between October, 1931, and September, 1933. "Agrarian change," he said, "is the most important issue facing the republic." In office, however, it took him a year and a half to draft a new land law. The explanation he gave was that the estate owners offered so much resistance to his political and religious reforms that he did not dare to venture into the more dangerous, because more fundamental, realm of economic reform. The result? In April, 1934, three years after the founding of the republic, fewer than ten thousand peasants had received land from the state.

While Azaña was in power he raised the wages of farm laborers by means of legislation. The moment he was ousted by the reactionaries, wages were lowered. The Republicans had undertaken public works to reduce unemployment. Their successors in office discontinued them. On March 7, 1934, Largo Caballero, later Prime Minister of Spain, said to me: "Spain under the republic received the best social legislation in the world. But the present Lerroux Cabinet has made it a dead letter." What a Republican ministry did was immediately undone by the disguised monarchists who superseded it. "I tied myself with legal bonds," Azaña said to me in 1934, "yet even so the rights objected." The aristocrats, landlords, and army chiefs did not realize that moderate reforms, by mollifying the peasantry, could save the ruling groups from extinction. They

closed their ears to the call which had summoned the republic into existence to solve Spain's problems.

Strangely enough, Spain's small industrialist class supported the reactionary position taken by the landlords. The industrialists should have welcomed a land reform which would create a home market for their goods. But they believed that more than economics was involved. They feared that the granting of land to the peasantry would rob the owning classes of political power. The manufacturers, therefore, who should have encouraged the republic in its attempts to stage a peaceful revolution which would have enriched the country, actually leagued themselves with the backward-looking landlords to prevent all amelioration and reform.

The purpose for which the republic was founded was thus thwarted. The monarchists threatened to capture the republic and subject it to their will. The people lost faith in the new regime. In the villages of Andalusia I asked the peasants in 1934 what the republic had given them. They said it had given them nothing. One woman cried out: "Damn the republic!"

"What is your hope?" I inquired.

"We are waiting for death," they replied.

"Why don't you seize the land?" I then asked.

"The answer is in two words," a political leader in the village of Pueblo del Rio replied. "Guardia Civil." They feared the police. The rights were ruling by means of terror. They were guided by principles antagonistic to the republic, its constitution, and fundamental law.

In October, 1934, the resentment of the workers exploded. A revolt broke out in the Asturias mining region in northern Spain. The reactionary government brought in Moorish troops from Africa and quelled the insurrection. "The rights suppressed the Asturias rising," Azaña said to me subsequently, "with a cruelty unparalleled in history."

Disaffection spread throughout the country. The economic situation went from bad to worse. "The financial position of the nation," Azaña declared, "was calamitous, and the entire social order was in a state of collapse." The sorely tried millions of city and farm laborers despaired of politics and of parliamentary government. Even reformist Socialists, whose entire careers had been built on a denial of revolution, began to see that Spain's only salva-

tion lay in a violent ejection of the monarchists who had emasculated the republic.

Bourgeois and Socialist Republicans now realized that if no ray of hope appeared to the village and city masses an explosion of popular wrath would engulf them all. There was a danger of spontaneous peasant and urban riots which would be drowned in blood by the ruthless authorities, unless the Republicans showed themselves capable of effective political action. Spurred by this necessity and taught by the sorry fate of the divided democracies of Germany, Austria, and other countries, Spanish Republicans of all hues formed a united front and went to the polls on February 16, 1936, to elect a new parliament. Much to their own surprise, the Popular Front succeeded in winning a majority of the Cortes seats. The present Loyalist government is the child of that legally elected Cortes.

3. THE POPULAR FRONT IN POWER

In the elections of February 16 and in several supplementary polls which took place on March 1, the Popular Front fusion ticket received 4,206,156 votes against 3,783,601 for the right parties and 681,047 for the center parties. (After the insurrection some of the center sympathized with the Loyalists.) The division of seats in the Cortes was: 258 for the Popular Front; 152 for the Right; 62 for the center.

The Popular Front won this victory even though innumerable Anarchists, who form the largest party supporting the Loyalists, in consonance with their anti-political principles, stayed away from the polls. It won despite the fact that before and on election day a reactionary government was in power in a country where electioneering terror is a fine art. It won against the open and vigorous opposition of the higher Catholic clergy. During the election campaign the Bishop of Barcelona, for instance, declared: "It is sinful to vote for the Popular Front. A vote for the conservative candidate is a vote for Christ." The Archbishop of Toledo urged his followers to "vote for the Catholic candidates, for you will thereby please the Holy Father."

Notwithstanding these formidable handicaps the Popular Front carried off the victory, and immediately thereafter a new Cabinet was set up which consisted entirely of liberal bourgeois Republicans but enjoyed the parliamentary support of the Socialists and Communists. Manuel

Azaña became Prime Minister once again. The attitude of the reactionaries to the Popular Front victory was expressed by General Franco himself in an interview at Tetuan with the *London News Chronicle* (July 29, 1936). "What about the February elections?" the correspondent asked. "Didn't they represent the national will?" "Elections never do," Franco replied.

The new Azaña government was lifted into office on a wave of widespread peasant and labor discontent. It had a mandate to rule more radically than its predecessors. The people were insisting on more drastic measures to improve their lot. But the reactionaries remained blind to these facts, and the second Azaña government accordingly conceived of its role as that of buffer between the impatient masses and the recalcitrant landlords with their lay and other allies.

Azaña is a man of great culture and integrity. Educated in the famous Escorial monastery, he became a prominent jurist and a leading intellectual. Author of several plays, three novels, a story of his youth entitled "The Garden of the Monks," which is one of the gems of the Spanish language, and a translation from the English of Borrow's "The Bible in Spain," he is so balanced a combination of the intellectual and the politician that he could easily forsake the one role for the other. When I interviewed him on April 4, 1936, my final question was, "Will you be here a year from now when I come back?"

"Of course," he replied, "unless I get bored with politics."

Boredom and excessive excitement may achieve the same result in the intellectual; but when he became Prime Minister again in February, 1936, Azaña occupied a strong position. His strength lay in the fact that although he was an ally of the Socialists and Communists, he was simultaneously the last hope of the bourgeoisie. The owning classes did not wish to unseat him because he was a firm bulwark against socialism, and the workers and peasants supported him because they were still too weak for a direct struggle with the bourgeoisie. Tactically this position was good, but it condemned Azaña to a policy of no initiative, for in himself he had no political strength. His party, consisting of government office-holders, professional men, and enlightened business people, was numerically small. Because of Spain's economic underdevelopment the middle class was too puny to serve as buffer or bridge

between the oppressed lower classes and the oppressing upper classes. There was therefore little contact or understanding between them. Azaña tried to help by acting as little as possible, but he probably came too late. While the landlords were as unyielding and stubborn as ever, the peasants soon began to help themselves. "Hunger and unemployment," wrote the Madrid correspondent of the conservative London *Times*, "are driving the inhabitants [of rural districts] to despair."

The movement started in the large and poor province of Caceres. Here, during Azaña's first term as Prime Minister, several thousand *Yunteros*, or owners of a yoke of mules but no land, had been allowed to rent part of the unused estates of large feudal barons. In 1934-35, however, while the Gil Robles-Lerroux reactionary forces controlled the government, these *Yunteros* were again driven off. After the Popular Front electoral victory the peasants felt encouraged, and in the province of Caceres they presented the provincial branch of the federal Institute of Agrarian Reform with an ultimatum: If you do not give us land in forty-eight hours, we will take it. On March 7, 1936, accordingly, Señor de la Fuente, chief of the Caceres branch of the institute, published a circular asking proprietors to rent some land to landless peasants. When I talked with De la Fuente in Caceres in April, he had received not a single reply. Five days after the institute's circular to the proprietors the peasants therefore marched with their mules and plows to the landlords' estates and each marked off for himself a modest parcel which he subsequently tilled and paid rent for.

In the neighboring province of Badajoz, hard by the Portuguese frontier, economic conditions were even worse than in Caceres. The region had 702,000 inhabitants (175,000 families), of whom between 80 and 90 per cent lived on the soil. Land ownership was heavily concentrated; 2,946 proprietors owned 40 per cent of the total surface of the province. Practically no proprietors fell in the class owning between two and fifty hectares. There was, in other words, no rural middle class. There were the holders of vast latifundia and the impecunious *Yunteros*. On March 25 in 150 villages of Badajoz, the peasants assembled at 5 a. m. with their stock and their implements and solemnly drew lots to decide which *Yunteros* were to go to what estates. No violence or resistance marked this occasion. The authorities were now Socialist and they confined the

Guardia Civil to barracks. The *Yunteros* plowed a furrow around their individual plots and then and there made public announcement of their occupation of the land. The land still belonged to the proprietors and had been taken merely in tenancy. The rent was paid to the owner through the Institute of Agrarian Reform, which legalized the *Yunteros'* action.

In this manner, within two months, 41,499 *Yunteros* had been settled on 1,502 estates covering 105,090 hectares in Badajoz, while 24,702 *Yunteros* had been settled on 948 estates covering 59,621 hectares in Caceres. In other provinces the land reform had scarcely got under way by the spring of 1936.

In April I discussed the new situation with Prime Minister Azaña. "Might not these changes on the land," I ventured, "strengthen the capitalist regime in the cities by creating a richer peasant market for industrial commodities?"

"Yes," he frankly replied. "They will strengthen the urban bourgeoisie. But that bourgeoisie is not anti-republican."

Señor Ruiz-Funez, Azaña's Minister of Agriculture, took the same view. No land, he said, had been confiscated by the new regime. The *Yunteros* were only being settled as tenant farmers. In 1936 the government's plan was to allocate land to 80,000 farmers. "This method of land reform, by renting land to *Yunteros*," Ruiz-Funez said to me, "will weaken the tendency toward socialism." That, as the left bourgeois Republicans saw it, would be the most salutary effect of the *Yuntero* movement.

I wished to learn for myself whether the hopes of Azaña and Ruiz-Funez were likely to be fulfilled. During and after the period when the land reform was at its height I traveled 2,000 kilometers through Caceres, Badajoz, and six other provinces in an attempt to feel the pulse of the peasantry. The advent of the Popular Front government and especially the new era in land tenure had stirred them profoundly. On the plaza of the little town of Caceres I accosted three woolly mountaineer *Yunteros* dressed in dark, patched corduroy suits and big black sombreros. They came from the village of Malpartida de Caceres, where 6,000 hectares of land had been distributed among the peasants. "We were in a cage before," one of them said to me, "and now we are out." They would harvest a crop in 1937 and until then they would live by hauling. All of

them were Socialists. They did not know what the land would cost them, whether they would keep it, or whether they would get more. But they had land, and they were pleased. "It is a beginning," the youngest said.

En route to Trujillo, where Francisco Pizarro, the conqueror of Peru was born, I stopped on a road that led through the estate of the Count of Torrearras. A man was plowing. With my friends of the Institute of Agrarian Reform, I got out of the automobile and beckoned to him. In true Spanish fashion he yelled to us to meet him halfway. He was Facundo Martin, a *Yuntero* who had received land for cultivation at a rental. He said that his situation was better, that the *Yunteros* who had got land were satisfied. It was not his land, he said. "I only work here. I would like to have my own farm. I work myself to death to earn enough to pay the high rent." The rent would amount to between one-quarter and one-third of his crop. Facundo was twenty-four years old and unmarried. "Life isn't good enough to marry," he said.

At Barcarrota, a village of white, smooth-faced homes in Badajoz, I chanced upon a Socialist meeting. About 300 men and women were assembled at the Casa del Pueblo, or people's house, to hear a speaker who had not arrived. I was offered the opportunity of putting questions to the audience and I took advantage of it avidly. I mounted a rude wooden platform and said:

"Why are you Socialists?"

"Because we want liberty," one woman replied.

"Because we don't want to starve," another added.

"Don't you eat enough?" I asked. The reply was a burst of laughter. I suggested that those who ate meat twice a week, raise their hands. No hand went up.

"Who eats meat once a week?" Not a hand went up. A woman rose and explained that the regular diet of most of them consisted of vegetable soup, black coffee, bread—when they had it—and sometimes sardines.

"Don't the children have milk?" I inquired. Several mothers with babies on their arms, pointed to their breasts.

"Yes," one said, "while they get it from us, but not later."

I now came to the subject which interested me most.

"Have you received land from the new government?"

Yes. All of them had received land. They hoped now they would live better. But they had to eat until the new

crop came in and they had no money. Moreover, they would need money for tools, animals, and seed.

"We have land now, but it is too little for a decent living," one man volunteered. Applause greeted this statement.

"How is it," I probed, "that Azaña, who is a bourgeois, has given you land?"

"The Socialists forced him!"

"We made him do it!"

"He had to!"

These exclamations expressed the sense of the meeting.

"And won't you all now become little capitalists?"

This provoked much mirth.

"Maybe we will some day live like human beings instead of animals."

"What about the landlords?" I asked. Derisive laughter.

"Let them weep a bit as we have been weeping all our lives," a mother proposed.

"Suppose the rights came back and took the land away," I asked.

"They will have to kill us first!"

"They will never be allowed to come back to office."

"They cannot force us to starve any longer!"

These and many other contacts with *Yunteros* who had received land warranted a number of conclusions: The *Yunteros* were pleased that they had land. They were more optimistic. They hoped to get additional land and perhaps loans from the state for equipment and cattle. They believed that the Socialist Party, to which most of them adhered, would help them in doing so. They were no longer in a mood for violent or desperate action. Azaña's land reform, which had commenced in the provinces where conditions were most critical, would probably give the peasants some hope and inaugurate a period of peace and adjustment in the countryside. Come what might, however, the peasants would not allow themselves to be driven off the land as they had been in the past by reactionary governments. They would further support the Popular Front and resist the politicians of the right.

I sat on a stone step in the central square of Badajoz waiting for my companions, who had gone into a cafe for a drink, and I entered this note in my book. "Azaña is saving himself without saving Spain. His land reform will temporarily gratify the *Yunteros* but will do little for the national economy." The land reform promised to raise the

standard of living slightly, but something more fundamental was necessary in order to banish misery and industrial stagnation from Spain. Azaña and the engineers of the Institute of Agrarian Reform were talking about farming collectives. In some sections, indeed, the peasants, on their own initiative and without ever having heard of collectives in the Soviet Union, had organized cooperative farms. The Socialists and Communists, however, put little trust in Azaña's land reform. In April, 1936, Largo Caballero, the Socialist leader told me that the people who were then getting land would not be able to sell their crops. In 1934 and 1935 there had been surplus food in the country while thousands starved. The ultimate solution was collectivization, Caballero declared, but Azaña would not go so far. Though disgruntled with Azaña's halfway measures, the Socialists and Communists continued, nevertheless, to bolster up his authority. They were sure he would fail, but they were patient with him in the face of the specter of reactionary rule that rose up the moment the idea of unseating Azaña was broached.

The landlords, on the other hand, looked with great disfavor on Azaña's mild land reform. The feudal barons of Spain were wedded to the ancient Roman conception of private property rights which brooked not the slightest interference. Utterly devoid of social outlook, and interested most of all in protecting their inherited privileges and wealth against any encroachment, they overflowed with bitterness toward the Popular Front government and the peasantry. During my trip through Estremadura and Andalusia in the spring of 1936, I talked to several big landlords who looked upon the forced renting of land to the *Yunteros* as the beginning of the end, the doom of the divine right of landowners. The landowners of all Spain saw in the events in Caceres and Badajoz a portent of what would soon happen to them. That they could not, for the moment, resist the government's measures made them hate the government all the more.

It was obvious that the possessing classes would not easily reconcile themselves to a land reform which they regarded as the opening wedge for socialism. In the months of March and April the reactionary rights were undoubtedly thinking of modes of resistance. It is possible, in the light of subsequent developments, that they were already doing more than thinking. The February elections had stunned them. Many of the prominent aristocrats literally

fled; they went abroad and transferred their money abroad, but enough fight was left in the rest of them to put the Republicans on guard. As Caballero said to me on April 3, 1936, "Now the reactionaries can come back into office only through a coup d'état." The estate owners had always found means of compelling their farm hands to vote for the right parties. In many villages inhabited by perhaps three landlord families and hundreds of Socialist *Yunteros* the balloting had often shown a majority for some black conservative candidate. Now, with the land reform, the barons would lose this possibility of electoral pressure. They thus not only resented the recent economic changes, but also were afraid that being numerically few they might never again recapture political power. The electoral victory of the Popular Front seemed like the handwriting on the wall.

Writing from Barcelona on April 16, 1936, I said: "Spain obviously must do something about her poverty and backwardness. The peasants and city workers demand better conditions. The right reactionaries, when in office, answered these demands with terror but nothing else, thus documenting a fact which is becoming clear to an increasing number of Spaniards—that the reactionaries have lost the right and never had the ability to rule the country. This is a very favorable development, and if the liberal Republicans, Socialists, and Communists behave wisely, the electoral victory which they won exactly two months ago will keep their enemies out of power for a long, long time, perhaps forever. The right reactionaries are the large landed proprietors, the church, the monarchists, and the few big industrialists. They are depressed, frightened, and disorganized. Their chief hope at the moment is a violent coup d'état with the aid of the army and the Civil Guard."

4. THE FORCES BEHIND FRANCO: LANDLORDS, INDUSTRIALISTS, ARMY, AND CHURCH

The possibility of a right uprising was on everybody's lips during the spring of 1936. In fact, several false alarms were sounded while I was in Madrid during the first fortnight of April, tanks and armed guards patrolled the streets, and the Socialists and Communists mobilized their poorly equipped militia to take posts on housetops. The long-awaited army coup in behalf of landlordism and retrogression took place on July 17, 1936. The government might have anticipated this move but did not.

Four forces stood behind the revolt—the army, the land-

lords, the big industrialists, and the church. These received support from Italian and German fascism. One power stood against it—the Spanish people.

According to the most authoritative study published in Madrid in 1932 and quoted with approval in the Foreign Policy Association's report on Spain dated January 15, 1937, the number of Spanish landlords who owned 250 hectares or more did not exceed fifteen or twenty thousand. With their families, therefore, the landowning class of Spain totaled something like 75,000 persons. Their indolence, combined with fear of a rising of the peasant masses, had undermined their trust in the Spanish earth. They allowed wheat lands to be put to grazing, and when the Republican Institute of Agrarian Reform urged them to reverse this process, the usual complaint was that the government threatened to ruin their flocks. The landlords took out of the land the maximum and gave back the minimum. The average annual production of wheat per hectare was 806 kilograms compared with four times that yield in many European countries. For years there was almost no investment in Spanish agriculture. Estates were mismanaged by overseers who acted at the same time as village political bosses and delivered the votes on election day. Idle, fashionable scions of landlords preferred the cafes of Madrid and Paris to the dry fields of Estremadura. The landowning class was losing its vigor and not reproducing its wealth, yet even where farms were only partially cultivated the estate owners held tenaciously to their property rights and objected to the rental of land to landless peasants. This small decadent class, more than any other, held Spain in its clutches.

The industrialists, whose plants were for the most part in the rich cities of Barcelona and Bilbao, were the landlords' allies. As in Russia, industrial progress in Spain had been a mushroom growth and brought with it strong working-class organization. But the manufacturers hated this child which entertained ambitions of being their gravedigger. And their hate made them apprehensive and reactionary.

The Spanish army, another powerful element of reaction, was not a class but a caste rooted in the rural and urban owning classes. The army was in many respects autonomous, and according to Gil Robles, the leader of the Catholic Popular Action Party, writing in the June 5, 1937, issue of *America*, it will be autonomous if and when

Franco wins. "Initiator of the national Spanish movement and hope of its future," Gil Robles declares, "is the army, which is really independent of any of the political parties that support it." The character of the Spanish army is strikingly revealed by its composition. In 1931 when the republic was established there were 21,000 officers in the army, or about as many as in the German army just before the World War; 21,000 officers to 130,000 men. There was one general for every 150 soldiers. The army consumed 30 per cent of the national budget, and for every \$3 spent on equipment and pay for the ranks, \$10 went as officers' salaries. Perhaps the military caste did not wish to make soldiers of the peasants and working men who would normally be the conscripts. Perhaps it was convinced that Spain was not threatened by invasion and could always with benefit remain neutral in a major European conflict. Yet the army, what with the Foreign Legion and the Moroccan auxiliaries, made the officers strong enough to wield enormous influence in the monarchy as well as in the republic. Army tribunals before 1931 tried civilians as well as soldiers. The status of officer was sacrosanct. Alfonso XIII lavished on the armed forces huge sums which too frequently went into the pockets of generals and army contractors. John Hay's observation in 1870 that "the Spanish army from general to corporal is penetrated with conspiracy" was equally true six decades later. The army was corrupt, inefficient, and loyal only to that government which did not offend the interests of the classes from which its officers sprang.

The republic knew this, but it was generous to the point of folly. It offered to retire into the reserve at full pay all officers who were in disagreement with republican principles. Eight thousand officers availed themselves of this opportunity to live in complete leisure and whisper and conspire in cafes against the new government. Even Azaña's Popular Front Cabinet tolerated the evils of the army and of the Civil Guard, a special police force numbering from 30,000 to 40,000 men. Shortly before the July revolt the government belatedly roused itself to feeble action. It shifted General Francisco Franco, who had been appointed chief of staff by Gil Robles, to the Canary Islands, and General Goded to the Balearics. Here they were better able to plot the overthrow of the government. By transferring them Madrid warned them that something worse might be in store for disloyal officers. They took the warn-

ing and planned the revolt. They had taken an oath of loyalty to the Spanish government and the Spanish constitution. Now they attempted forcibly to overthrow that government, only recently elected by popular vote. Nevertheless, many foreigners who loudly denounce alleged believers in the overthrow of governments by violence, have sympathized with and aided the Spanish rebels. This inconsistency would be worthy of more comment if there were not so much hypocrisy in politics already. The protagonists of "law and order" object to violent attacks on regimes which serve their purposes; but they applaud the Spanish military insurrection against a regime which they dislike.

From the very beginning of the army's insurrection, the Catholic church of Spain has been at the service of the rebels. Some priests in Loyalist territory staunchly support the legal government, and in the Basque country the Catholics have taken sides against Franco. But on the whole the Catholic hierarchy has been the partisan of those who rose up to overthrow by violence a legally constituted government.

In the light of the history of the Catholic church in Spain, any other stand would have been startling. Under the monarchy the church was an established institution, a branch of the government, and every priest from the archbishop down to the lowliest father in a distant village was on the state's pay roll. Education was largely in the hands of the church. Yet in some provinces as many as 60 to 70 per cent of the population were illiterate, and Spain was one of the most backward countries in Europe in respect to public enlightenment. Nor did great culture exist in the huge monasteries and academies. The church had grown fat and decadent. Lawrence A. Fernsworth, a Roman Catholic and correspondent of the *London Times*, writing about Spain in *Foreign Affairs* for October, 1936, stated that "the church was the ally of the state; but the state was regarded by the people as their oppressor. At least, illiterate and hungering masses saw it that way. Moreover, the church constituted a heavy drain upon the economic resources of the country. It was top-heavy with clergy—sixteen to twenty of them could be seen any day at some modest funeral, each one collecting his fee."

The Catholic church of Spain was one of the largest landowners and business concerns of the country. It operated hotels and factories, owned department stores, numerous electric power plants, newspapers, etc., and represented

a vast accumulation of capital. Its position within the state and its activity in the commercial world fixed its political sympathies. These, in turn, determined the attitude of the people to it. The church was regarded as just another feature of the ruling system.

"In the time of the constitutional monarchy and as a relic from the ancient connections between the crown and the church," José Maria de Semprun Gurrea, a member of the Conservative Party and lecturer in the Philosophy of Law at the University of Madrid, wrote in the French Catholic review *Esprit* for November, 1936, "the king and, in his name, the government had the right of appointment to bishoprics. This right gave rise to unedifying intrigues, and the habit, equally unedifying, of classing bishops under partisan titles. Such a bishop was known as the initiate of the Minister X; another of Y, the president of the council. The system of promotion, legal in itself, was far from bringing about the choice of real spiritual leaders. Those elected were, with few exceptions, men too immersed in temporal matters, too closely connected with great personages, the world of the nobility, and the greater bourgeoisie which surrounds the high places of power and social life. The bishops spent too little time with the people, and too much with persons of quality. Their world was rather 'the world,' and sometimes even 'the world of fashion.'" There was therefore a wide gulf between church and people. The Catholic hierarchy neglected its duties to the masses. The Anglican Bishop of Gibraltar writing in the *Church Times* of February 26, 1937, said: "The Roman Catholic church in Spain has failed and failed lamentably to present Christianity faithfully to the nation." In Pueblo del Rio in 1934 I asked the women what they thought of the church. They replied: "The church does nothing for us. The church is for the rich. We are Moors," that is, non-believers.

When the republic came, it continued for some time to pay reduced subsidies to the church. But it disestablished the church and made public education secular. This condition prevails in most Western countries and has been accepted by the Catholics in them, yet it sufficed to align the Catholic church of Spain unalterably against the liberal forces of the republic. Openly and secretly the hierarchy fought the republic from the very beginning to the day of Franco's uprising. In 1936 Prime Minister Azaña said to me apropos of the church issue in Spain: "He who

fighters in the front line may get a bullet." The church was conservative and opposed to the Popular Front. It played a political role. It was therefore treated as a political antagonist. The Spanish church is only "reaping the whirlwind," said a report adopted by the eighty-ninth annual session of the New York East Methodist Episcopal Conference on May 13, 1937.

When the generals rebelled, the hierarchy naturally made common cause with them. Since the commencement of the civil war, bishops have blessed Franco's troops, priests in frocks have borne arms in the ranks against the Loyalists, and Franco has used churches as fortresses and arsenals. These facts are heavily documented and not denied. Here is a sample by G. L. Steer, famous British correspondent, in the *New York Times* of May 19, 1937: "The insurgents occupied a cemetery and a church. In the church tower at ten o'clock I saw their machine-guns at a distance of 400 yards." The Loyalists would of course try to destroy that church.

But even before the civil war the hostility of the people to the church was great. I myself regret the burnings of churches and monasteries in Spain. But subjective reactions are of little importance. The fact that Spaniards spontaneously sacked religious institutions and killed priests—the numbers have been exaggerated by the sensational press—is a revealing social phenomenon, and it can only mean that the church had no hold on their minds, that the people considered an attack on clericalism as part of their defense against fascism. This was inevitable when the clergy had given the impression of complete identification with reaction.

Catholic hierarchies abroad and the Vatican have definitely approved of Franco's rebellion against constituted authority. On February 1, 1937, the *Osservatore Romano*, official organ of the Vatican, wrote, "We do not know when Franco will take Madrid. We can only hope that it will be soon." Catholics everywhere have attempted to stir up sentiment against the Loyalists. The same thing happened in Spain. When Cardinal Hayes of New York says that a triumph of the "radical elements" in Spain would be "a menace to the entire civilization" (*New York Post* of March 11, 1937) he merely reflects the much more violent attitude of his Spanish confreres.

This stand by the Catholic church will harm Catholicism in Spain no matter who wins the civil war. The Catholic

hierarchy of Spain is fighting Franco's battles to its own hurt. Franco will go down in history as the man who bombed and bombarded civilians in Madrid and in the Basque Catholic country, who imported the hated Moors and foreign armies into Spain. He will be known as the general who started a revolt which laid waste vast territories and resulted in the killing of hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children. Spain will not forgive him even if he wins. Nor will Spain forgive his clerical abettors. Franco's hands are red with blood. The Catholic hierarchy upholds those hands. The Catholic church in Spain will be the loser whatever happens. Putting it mildly, the London *Catholic Herald* said on August 21, 1936: "The church, it is certain, will gain nothing if it creeps back to power under Franco's bayonets. Only a thorough spiritual cleansing and revival can save Catholicism in Spain." Some will doubt whether a clergy that wished to lead its followers into the camp of a Franco is capable of such a spiritual effort. Protestantism, which had some followers in Spain and which Franco is persecuting, may reap some of the benefits of the situation when peace is restored. But in general religion will suffer. The help which Catholic priests have given the rebel Franco has shocked many true Catholics.

Throughout Europe the Vatican has found in fascism a rival and hostile philosophy. It fights fascism in Germany. But in Spain it helps fascism, and in Spain it walks arm in arm with anti-Catholic Nazi troops. This inconsistency will plague it in the future.

The alliance of church, army, industrialists, and landlords represented a minority. There could be nothing in common between Franco and the millions of undernourished peasants, or between Juan March, Franco's industrialist backer, and the radical workers of Bilbao and Barcelona. The overwhelming mass of Spain's 28,000,000 inhabitants had very little for which they would owe any gratitude to the feudal barons, manufacturers, staff generals, and bishops.

II. THE CIVIL WAR

1. THE PEOPLE TAKE THEIR STAND

The Franco revolt, therefore, was immediately rejected by the bulk of the Spanish nation. In the important cities of Barcelona, Madrid, Valencia, Bilbao, and Alicante, and in hundreds of large and small villages, the citizenry, armed literally with little more than staves and stones, overpowered the garrisons and declared against General Franco. This phenomenon, which occurred in what is now Loyalist territory as well as in Franco territory, is eloquently attested by an important rebel publication entitled "The Communist Atrocities," issued in London "by authority of the Committee of Investigation appointed by the government at Burgos." In Almendralejo, it states, in the province of Badajoz, "the arrests [of "anti-reds"] took place from July 18 to August 6, the eve of the entrance of the troops into the city"—which means that the Loyalist civilian government continued in control until Franco brought in his Moors from Africa. Antequera, in the province of Malaga, "experienced the reign of red terror which lasted from July 18 until August 12." Likewise Azuaga, in the province of Badajoz, which "from the first day of the military rising, July 18 till December 24 . . . was in the hands of the Communist element." And Burguillos del Cerro, in the province of Badajoz, "was in the hands of the reds from July 15 till September 14, on which date the Nationalist army obtained possession of it."

Further, "the reign of Communists in Espejo, in the province of Cordoba, dates from July 22 . . . till September 25, the day on which our victorious troops occupied the town." "During a period of two months the inhabitants of Ronda, in the province of Malaga, were under the control of Communists." El Saucejo, a town of 6,588 inhabitants in the province of Seville, "was taken by the Nationalist forces on September 4." Until then the Loyalists ruled this place which is in the heart of Franco land. These instances could be multiplied endlessly. On the basis of Franco's own evidence it is clear that the Spaniards did not want Franco. There was not a single case where the civil population rose up and took over the power in the name of the insurgents.

It should be noted that "Nationalist" as it is used in this rebel publication always means the army of Moors and

Foreign Legionnaires, while "Communist" is a synonym for the Popular Front, which consists of many parties, including some strongly anti-Communist. Thus on page 155 there is a reference to the "Communist militia of the C. N. T." The C. N. T. is an Anarcho-Syndicalist organization. So that this phrase is like saying, the A. F. of L., headquarters of the C. I. O.

During the first phase of the insurrection, in the latter half of July and early in August, Franco had actually lost the civil war. The people took sides against him and successfully opposed his mutinous Spanish soldiers. But the rebels were in a position quickly to transport non-Spanish troops into Spain and this, with the help of German and Italian airplanes which were available to Franco three days after the uprising, soon turned the tide against the Loyalists.

The Loyalist army consisted of local militias which joined the armed forces because they wanted to fight for a new Spain and against fascism, but not because they had any military qualities. Since the Napoleonic wars Spain had not participated in a foreign war. Its people were not trained and had no military psychology. The annual conscript class was small. Almost all the officers and an estimated 90 per cent of the rank and file of the regular army went over to Franco when he broke his oath. The militias had enthusiasm and devotion to the cause, but no experience and few weapons.

Even when the civil war was six months old, not every Loyalist soldier had his individual rifle. The scarcity of rifles in the early months brought many a disaster. Mexico sent 20,000 muskets in a moment of dire need but they did not suffice. I often saw arms at the front marked "Oviedo 1896." Machine-guns were rare; so was artillery. In the beginning the government had no airplanes at all. Subsequently André Malraux, the famous French novelist, organized a foreign flying squadron which did valiant service. Before long, however, it ceased to be a match for the large numbers of bombing and pursuit planes which were flown in from Germany and Italy.

Under these circumstances Franco's army encountered little resistance in pushing up quickly from Badajoz to Merida, to Caceres, to Talavera de la Reina, to Toledo, and to the environs of Madrid. On November 6, the rebels stood at the gates of the capital.

Meanwhile the insurgents had organized a government

at Burgos. In official decrees dated August 3, September 26, and September 28, Azaña's agrarian reforms of the early part of the year were canceled, and all land which had been distributed among landless peasants was returned to the estate holders. Public instruction, an edict declared, would no longer be secular. Religious education, on the other hand, became compulsory in all schools. At the same time the monarchist flag replaced the banner of the republic. Franco thus stood revealed once more. He was looking backward. The people of Spain were well acquainted with the Francos. Franco had no need of promising the Spaniards anything because they knew from his past what he would be in the future. The majority of the nation had rejected Franco and the reactionaries of his type on February 16, 1936. They rejected him in July when they overcame his mutinous troops in Barcelona, Madrid, and other places. They were rejecting him every day in every way. Indeed, every day in Spain was election day. There are many ways of voting, and the dropping of a ballot into an urn is the easiest and not always the most convincing. Lenin once said that in 1917 "the Czarist army voted for peace with its legs. It ran away from the trenches." Often as I rode through the Spanish provinces during the civil war, peasants tilling their fields would drop their plows when they saw the car, lift a clenched fist, and shout "Salud!" Those peasants did not know me. I dashed past them in a second. But they felt an inner urge to vote that morning, or afternoon, for Spanish democracy. In the months of September and October, as Franco pressed steadily on toward Madrid, I daily watched whole villages evacuate in front of his advancing hosts. Each time he approached a settlement, the bulk of its inhabitants packed their meager worldly goods on mule- or dog-drawn carts, placed the old grandmothers or young children on top, and drew off in the direction of Madrid. They did not know where they were going. They slept by the roadsides. They had neither money nor food. They did not know what the morrow would bring. They knew only one thing: they did not want to live with Franco. Their evacuation was a vote of non-confidence in the rebels. It was a vote for the Loyalists.

The defense of Madrid is likewise a plebiscite. General Mola had boasted that he would drink coffee in a Madrid cafe on October 12, the "Day of the Race," the day on which Columbus discovered America. Franco declared, in the finest Spanish tradition of announcing military move-

ments in advance, that he would take Madrid on November 7, just to celebrate the Bolshevik Revolution. Then it was officially stated by the rebels that the Moors would enter the Catholic capital on Christmas Day. Yet Madrid still resists.

2. THE MIRACLE OF MADRID

The miracle of Madrid is intelligible only through the attitude of the civilian population. Any evening during the siege, after the noises of traffic had been hushed, I could open my hotel window and hear distinctly the rat-a-tat-tat of machine-guns and the individual cracks of rifles. One night, coming home from the front, it was brought home to me very graphically how close to Madrid the enemy was—the street cars, their windows painted blue to keep in their lights, had stopped after curfew hours and stood still on their tracks in the central streets and squares of Madrid, for the trolley car barns were in the hands of Franco. From most places in Madrid a twenty-minute walk brings one to the trenches. The fate of Madrid, therefore, rests in the hands of its women. I have seen these women, dressed for the most part in black, forming queues early in the morning to receive their meager rations of peas, rice, vegetable oil, and bread. They often stood five abreast in a line three hundred yards long. Not far away, their husbands, or brothers, or sons were fighting under rebel fire. Their relatives might have been killed or wounded yesterday. They had left the older children at home. They might return to find their bodies mangled and crushed under houses bombed by German and Italian airplanes. Fuel was as scarce as food, and the water supply was turned off for at least ten hours during every twenty-four. The women waited patiently for hours, frequently holding babies in their arms. Hostile bombers have dropped bombs on such queues, bombs which are steel cylinders containing 100, or 200, or 500 pounds of explosives. Arriving at such a scene several minutes after bombing, one sees limbs scattered, brains and intestines spattered against walls, and remnants of human bodies strewn in all directions. The wear and tear on the nerves and physical condition of the living is terrific. Those women of Madrid are the martyrs and the heroines. If ten thousand women of the capital rose up in protest and walked into the arms of Franco, the siege of Madrid would be ended and Franco would be master of Spain's capital. But the women, as well as the

men, vote "no" on Franco. That is a plebiscite sealed with blood, a democracy paid for with a heavy toll of human lives. Instead of depression, fervor and faith in victory rule Madrid. As soldiers march through the streets on their way to the front, these black-dressed women of the queues give them the clenched-fist signal, and cry "No Pasaran!"—they shall not pass. The military are executing an order of the civilian population when they hold the city against the rebels. "Madrid must become the tomb of fascism," read the placards posted throughout Madrid when Franco's troops neared the city. The spirit within the city stiffened the backbone of the Loyalist soldiers who fought in its outskirts. The men could not be less courageous than the women.

3. FOREIGN PARTICIPATION

Other factors strengthened the Loyalist army. During most of October the government forces were practically without the support of airplanes. Day after day Franco's procedure was as follows: His Junkers and Capronis would bomb a village or Loyalist position. Then the Moors would rush in and occupy it. Franco also enjoyed a tremendous superiority of artillery, machine-guns, and rifles. In October small Italian whippet tanks made their appearance. For months the Non-Intervention Committee had been holding sessions in London. Germany, Italy, and Portugal were partners to its agreement not to ship munitions into Spain. But the committee had become a laughing-stock. The whole world knew that Hitler and Mussolini were honoring the agreement in the breach. The agreement meant that while France, England, and other truly neutral countries refused to supply arms to the legally constituted government of Spain, which by all principles of international law was entitled to such aid, the fascist states uninterruptedly furnished the insurgents with weapons of war. Whatever its intention, the effect of the non-intervention pact was profoundly disadvantageous to the Loyalists.

On October 7, accordingly, the Soviet government's representative in the London Non-Intervention Committee told that body that "his government feared the situation created by repeated violations of the agreement would render the agreement virtually non-existent, and that they could in no case agree to turn the agreement into a screen shielding the military aid given to the rebels by some of the participants in the committee." The Soviet govern-

ment, therefore, declared that if the violations of the agreement were not immediately stopped, Moscow would consider itself free from the obligations arising out of the agreement. The news of this statement released explosions of joy in Spain and Russia. The U. S. S. R. was hailed as Spain's great friend, and the newspapers were full of radiant editorials and optimistic comment. On October 16, Joseph Stalin wrote: "The toiling classes of the U. S. S. R. merely carry out their duty when they give all possible aid to the revolutionary masses of Spain. They realize that the liberation of Spain from the yoke of fascist reactionaries is not the private affair of Spaniards but the general concern of all advanced and progressive mankind." The concrete effects of these announcements began to appear during the third week of October in the form of airplanes and large, fast tanks. Franco's domination of the air was no longer unquestioned. The sense of inferiority and helplessness engendered in a soldier when he sees his regiment bombed time and again while his own side has no planes was replaced by a feeling of pride and rejoicing. The morale of the Spanish army began to rise steeply.

Help also came from foreign intellectuals and workingmen. But the Loyalists felt the lack of shock troops consisting of experienced fighters. Accordingly, several months after Franco rebelled, the Communist organizations in France and other countries organized an International Brigade in which World War veterans and men trained as conscripts in the armies of Europe enrolled for active service in Spain. There were many Communists, many Italian Socialists, Belgian Socialists, and non-party anti-fascists. They had all opposed fascism by attending meetings, marching in street demonstrations, distributing literature, etc., in their native countries. Now they were transferring the scene of their activities to the Madrid trenches, where the battle against international fascism was hottest. They were fighting for Spain, but at the same time they were directing their shots against the fascisms at home, for it was generally realized that a Franco victory would be a victory for Hitler and Mussolini and therefore for fascism generally. Spain had become the key to Europe's future political and social development. The men of the International Brigade came in legal and illegal fashion. Some of them walked hundreds of miles, stole across frontiers, and arrived at recruiting headquarters footsore and penniless. They hailed from farm and bakery

and steel mill. They hailed also from universities, sheltered homes, and ivory towers. With hardened proletarians came men like Ludwig Renn, ex-German nobleman and aristocrat, Nazi prisoner and outstanding novelist; Lukach, Hungarian author, a World War veteran, who was given the rank of general; Ralph Fox, British Communist novelist and author of a life of Lenin; several British poets; the son of a British rear admiral, and others. They were all volunteers, the Lafayettes of the modern industrial age. Just as Madrid was about to fall into Franco's lap, the International Brigade's first unit, 1,900 strong, marched into the fray. For the first time the Moors were stopped. For the first time the militiamen saw the heels and backs of Franco's soldiers. The Spaniards learned that it could be done. The International Brigade became a practical school for Spanish units. The militiamen grew to love their foreign comrades, and fought best when some of their companies and battalions were amalgamated with sections of the International Brigade. The international Popular Front against fascism had become a reality. The International Brigade served not merely by its own fighting but by raising the fighting capacity of thousands of Spaniards.

The size of the International Brigade has been wildly exaggerated, partly as an implied tribute to its military achievements, and partly, too, in an attempt to justify the sending of large units of German and Italian infantry. But in the middle of January, 1937, the International Brigade's total strength was no more than 13,000, and at no time has its effective strength exceeded 20,000. Yet it has written a glorious page in the history of the Spanish civil war.

On November 6 the Madrid government fled from the capital to Valencia. The Junta, or Committee of Defense, which assumed charge, was burdened with the double task of checking Franco and supplying a hungry, cold, bomb-torn city, swollen by the advent of several hundred thousand refugees. It acquitted itself so well that many in its entourage began to have ambitions for it and conceived of the Junta as the provisional revolutionary government of Spain. Gradually, however, prestige and authority returned to the Caballero Cabinet. It alone could send the reinforcements, munitions, food, and money without which Madrid would be lost, and it steadily established its control over the rest of Loyalist Spain.

Before the siege of Madrid had lasted a month, it became apparent that Franco could not take the city with the limited forces at his command. He had vast storehouses of guns and other equipment, but too few men. The Moors and Foreign Legion were being decimated in stubborn attacks on the city, and reinforcements could not be obtained. Most Spaniards refused to fight for him, and those who were pressed into the rebel ranks proved to be unreliable material. At this stage—about the middle of December, 1936—Franco had lost the war a second time. He could make no progress, and to stand still was disastrous. There was only one solution: he appealed to Italy and Germany for soldiers. Practically all Franco's pilots and tank drivers were German or Italian. Many of his gunners were likewise Italian or German. But the fascist powers had sent no compact fighting units to Spain. Franco now asked for them, and Hitler and Mussolini complied. The figures are necessarily in dispute. Nevertheless, it is a safe estimate that Germany shipped no fewer than 10,000 and perhaps as many as 20,000 trained soldiers to the Franco lines, while Mussolini was more generous with at least 50,000 and perhaps 80,000 or 90,000. Portugal did its bit, too.

The Soviet Union has sent no soldiers to the Loyalists. There are at most a dozen Soviet citizens in the International Brigade and several hundred former white or counter-revolutionary Russians from France, who by joining sought to document their new political attitude. They are endeavoring to return to Moscow via Madrid. In other respects, however, the military assistance given the Loyalists by the U. S. S. R. was similar to that given to Franco by Germany and Italy. Both sides received airplanes (plus pilots), tanks, cannons, and machine-guns from their foreign friends.

Yet fascist intervention in Spain differs completely from the Soviets' help to the Popular Front. The Valencia government has stated publicly that it possesses evidence of conversations which took place in Rome in 1934 between Mussolini and Spanish reactionary politicians wherein the Duce undertook to assist in the forcible overthrow of the Spanish republic and its replacement by a monarchy. Data is available to support a hypothesis that Germany and Italy were informed in advance about Franco's proposed coup against the Madrid government. General Sanjurjo, initiator of an abortive army rising in August, 1932, who

was to have been the leader of the 1937 revolt but whose airplane crashed when he attempted to fly from Lisbon to rebel territory on the second day of the insurrection, was in Berlin shortly before July 17, and Franco himself was in touch with German representatives. The presumption of preliminary knowledge and aid is a strong one, but the final demonstration waits upon the publication of further documents. It is known, however, that three days before the revolt started, Italy ordered six military airplanes to Franco in Spanish Morocco. Three of these crashed in French Morocco, and Governor General Victor Denain reported to Paris on the nature of the craft, stating that their pilots had received their orders on July 15 (*Manchester Guardian*, March 16, 1937). German and Italian airplanes were carrying Moorish soldiers from Morocco to Spain in the second fortnight of July. The situation, accordingly, amounted to this: a disloyal general had no sooner risen against his government than two foreign powers were ready to give him the wherewithal of victory. From the point of view of established bourgeois governments this would appear to be a most dangerous precedent. In similar circumstances the German Henlein party in Czecho-Slovakia might seize a few villages or towns in provinces coterminous with Germany and then invite the Reichswehr to come to its assistance. The result might quickly become a European war. When, in addition to military equipment, Germany and Italy placed whole regiments of trained soldiers on Spanish soil, the world was face to face with a full-fledged invasion of a foreign state which had been guilty of no crime or even mild offense against either of the invading governments. Treaties have long ago ceased to be serious considerations in international affairs. But for open and cynical flouting of laws, rules, and pacts, recent events in Spain have no equal in all post-war anarchy.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, scrupulously adhered to the non-intervention agreement which it, in common with a score of other powers, including Germany, Italy, and Portugal, had signed. (Soviet trade unions, however, contributed food and clothing worth many millions of gold rubles to their fellow-workers in Spain during the early months of the civil war.) It was only in October, after the non-intervention compact had become a generally recognized farce, that the Soviets commenced to aid the Spanish government with war material which it

was entitled under international law to purchase unhampered and at all times.

Soviet assistance to the Loyalists differed also in its motives from that which fascist states accorded Franco. It has been said that Franco promised Germany and Italy monopoly concessions in the Bilbao iron mines, the Almaden mercury fields near Ciudad Real, the Rio Tinto copper mines, and other mineral deposits of Spain. It would be natural if the rebels, having won, would out of gratitude and to annul their indebtedness for munitions shipped, grant Germany and Italy special privileges in exploiting the wealth of their country. As the London *Economist* of May 15, 1937, put it: "A government placed (and probably maintained) in power by German and Italian bayonets and bombers would be in no position effectively to resist foreign encroachment on Spain's natural resources." Reports have also appeared regarding the promise of spheres of influence or even colonies to Germany and Italy. Thus the Balearic Islands are said to have been made over to Italy, and it is an established fact that Italian troops and agents have made themselves very much at home on the island of Majorca. As part of this scheme, the Germans were to receive the Canary Islands or coaling and naval stations on them, as well as a preferred position in Spanish Morocco, in which Germany had manifested keen interest during the Kaiser's time.

But the stakes in Spain are even higher than these important considerations. Spain has an invaluable geographic position, especially for Italy. A foothold in Spain or the friendship of a vassal Spanish government might be decisive in a future war. Italy, thanks to the conquest of Ethiopia, has become the active, and the even greater potential, rival of the far-flung British Empire, and the intrenchment of Rome in Spain would extend Italian control of the western Mediterranean. For similar reasons Germany would be pleased to dig in in Spain and Morocco.

Italy and Germany, bent on expansion, are maneuvering in Spain for new strategic positions. The Spanish civil war has in this sense ceased to be merely a struggle between two domestic factions and has taken on many of the aspects of an international conflict. The first battle of the second World War is now being fought in Spain. A victory for Franco would be a victory for Hitler and Mussolini. Fascist intervention in Spain is not an isolated phenomenon. It is part of a chain of events which began when

the Japanese marched into Manchuria in September, 1931. The ease with which Tokyo accomplished this violation of foreign territory and the ineffectiveness of the protests of foreign powers and the League of Nations undoubtedly facilitated Mussolini's decision to attack Ethiopia in October, 1935. Similarly, Mussolini's triumph in East Africa notwithstanding efforts by the League of Nations and Great Britain to block him showed Hitler that he had nothing to fear if he scrapped international treaties and militarized the Rhineland. He did so on March 7, 1936. This momentous occasion passed off so smoothly that both Hitler and Mussolini were convinced they could now defy the rest of the world, especially if they acted together. This is the pre-history of their intervention in Spain, and the fact that in Spain, too, they met with little resistance from England and France gave them an even greater contempt for the vacillating democracies. A fascist triumph in Spain would thus prove that in Europe today he who dares, wins. Depending, of course, on the internal strength of Germany and Italy, these countries could then launch other adventures in which the benefits obtained by them in Spain would grant them an additional initial advantage. The democratic powers would be in danger.

In Great Britain and France these truths are understood by many persons. Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, the well-known British military authority, for instance, has expressed concern for the "life-line of the Empire" in the event of a fascist victory in Spain. "The danger is so obvious," Captain Hart stated (see *Manchester Guardian*, of April 15, 1937), "that it is hard to understand the eagerness with which some of the most vocally patriotic sections of the British public desire the rebels' success. A military-minded Spain allied with the fascist powers might make Gibraltar untenable and even threaten our route round the Cape by an air base in the Canaries. The danger would be even worse if a hostile air and submarine base was established in the Balearics." But those who determine British policy were torn between their desire to shield the British Empire by thwarting German and Italian designs in Spain, and their distrust of the Loyalists, whom they regard as Communists or a preparation for communism. This economic or class prejudice paralyzed the natural British inclinations to prevent the enemies of the Empire from pressing their schemes against it. Likewise in France the possibility that Germany and Italy would create an-

other front south of the Pyrenees, which might be disastrous to France in case of a German attack on Alsace, and the fact that an Italian force in the Balearics could stop France from bringing over her colonial troops from North Africa, should have created overwhelming sympathy among the bourgeoisie for Loyalist Spain. This, coupled with the very vigorous championship of the legal Spanish government on the part of the French trade unions, might have found more concrete expression than the non-intervention agreement. But here, too, economic prejudices against the Loyalists frustrated national desires. The result was that both France and England became split personalities in relation to the Spanish civil war. Divided allegiance was especially obvious in England, where sympathies often swayed with the fortunes of war. In the beginning, when Franco seemed to be the sure victor, British sentiment leaned toward him. Later, the gallant defense of Madrid swung British sympathies to the other side. Because of the balance between what the rulers of England ought to do to safeguard their Empire, and what they think is their duty toward the maintenance of capitalism, there is always this uncertainty in her attitude. If England and France were clearly anti-fascist at home, they would experience no difficulty in carrying out a firm anti-fascist foreign policy. But they are not clearly anti-fascist, and they therefore lack the firmness which might have benefited the Loyalist cause. In fact, their attitudes have had the effect of helping Franco's cause.

The Soviet Union, however, had no such problem. By its philosophy and social structure anti-fascist, it passed through no inner struggle before deciding where its sympathies in Spain lay. There were questions of expediency and technical obstacles. Delicate diplomatic formalities had to be observed in order that the benefit which the Loyalists received from Soviet assistance might not be canceled by the hostility it provoked in England and France. The Bolsheviks were first of all concerned lest a Hitler and Mussolini victory in Spain hasten the second World War. Moscow detests war. It has nothing to gain from war. It could obviously entertain no territorial ambitions in Spain. Russia's pro-Loyalist activity in Spain partakes of the nature of war prevention. In the present state of world armaments and international tension, there is no use talking peace or yearning for peace. The only way to achieve peace is to stop the fascist aggressors who have made wars and who

are the most likely initiators of more wars. Fascist regimes require frequent foreign triumphs to sugarcoat the pill of domestic hardships. Peace, or the inability to start and successfully conclude a military adventure, consequently becomes an embarrassment to the fascist powers and an element in their weakness. By preventing war Russia weakens fascism. By weakening fascism Russia helps the democracies who lack the unity of purpose to help themselves. This is therefore a service to the British and French empires, which, sated now, want the status quo and no war. But it is above all a service to the new Spain that is to rise on Franco's grave. Soviet efforts on behalf of the Loyalists, accordingly, stimulate revolution in one country, stabilize the capitalist democracies in other countries, and contribute to the downfall of totalitarian systems in still a third group of nations. Anyone who seeks to simplify this situation is departing from the complicated reality of modern times. Moscow may not be interested in safeguarding British imperialism against its fascist rivals. But this would be the inevitable by-product of the establishment of a liberal or social-democratic or even soviet state in Spain. The only way of attacking British imperialism via Spain is to let Franco win.

It is strangely paradoxical but true that the same set of Soviet actions staves off an invasion of the U. S. S. R., strengthens the French and British bourgeoisies, undermines the Spanish bourgeoisie, and upsets the scheme of Italian and German fascism. The naive and malicious contend that each of these results is deliberate and welcome. The discerning realize that no one result is obtainable without all the rest. Paris may be using the Bolsheviks, but the Bolsheviks get their benefits from Paris, too. If there were no such exchange, neither party would be foolish enough to play the game. But since the two sides are so different, the advantages they derive from their relationship must be of a contradictory character. They reflect a crude working arrangement between two separate worlds, the bourgeois democracies and the slowly emerging Soviet democracy, unequally menaced by a common enemy—fascism.

The prospect of the spread of communism to another country is as appealing to Russia as the chance of implanting fascism in Spain is to Germany and Italy. Soviet aid to Spain has undoubtedly strengthened the Communist Party there and created much pro-Communist sentiment.

But the Bolsheviks do not believe that a revolution can be exported. They hold that the need for revolution grows in national soil. They are convinced that ultimately Spain will become Communist. But they do not wish to interfere in internal Spanish affairs because they know how deeply Spaniards would resent it. They know intervention would defeat its own ends. In interviews granted to the press, Franco has stated that he is a fascist and favors the Italian type of corporative state. He has formally established himself as fascist dictator. Hitler congratulated him when he did so. But loyalist Spain has set up no dictatorship. And its leaders insist that it will remain a democratic state. Moscow openly applauds this intention.

4. FACTIONS AMONG THE LOYALISTS

At present Loyalist Spain is a democracy. On April 15, 1937, in approximately the same week that Franco abolished all parties except the Fascist Party, Premier Largo Caballero assured a delegation of British women members of Parliament, consisting among others the Duchess of Atholl, Ellen Wilkinson, Dame Rachel Crowdy, and Eleanor Rathbone, when they asked him whether Spain would become a soviet state, that it would be a "parliamentary democracy which would utilize the experience gained by the civil war." He emphasized the fact that his opinion was based as much upon political as upon moral considerations. "A feeling of union and solidarity has arisen among the various political parties who support the legitimate government," he said, "and this feeling will survive the war, with no political party attempting to impose its particular platform upon the others." The Duchess of Atholl made this comment after the interview with Caballero: "The war in Spain is a war for freedom. The struggle of the government's troops is a struggle for the independence of Spain as well as for the security of England and France."

The exigencies of war obviously limit the freedom of individuals. But the Popular Front is in its essence democratic because it consists of parties with varying philosophies and policies; what the Loyalist government does is the result of a give and take and often of preliminary negotiations and pourparlers between groups. Some have regarded the Communists' advocacy of democracy in Spain as a tactical maneuver to mislead foreign democracies and bourgeois liberals into supporting the Loyalists. This in-

terpretation is wrong; such a trick would soon become too transparent for use. The democracy slogan means that the Communists have no desire to establish in Spain a dictatorship guided by one party as in Russia. Spanish conditions are different. The Communists do not wish to suppress the Anarchists or Socialists or left Republicans or any anti-fascist group. All these parties are united in fighting Franco. The Popular Front combines the most variegated elements, and it was not without reason that on February 8, 1937, Lord Cranbourne, British Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated in reply to a question in the House of Commons that "the British government are sure that the Valencia government was legally constituted and represented all the Spanish parties except one or two small groups."

The Popular Front extends from the far right to the far left. It includes on the conservative flank the Basque Catholics, who, though separated geographically from the rest of Loyalist Spain, have stubbornly defended their country and the autonomy which the Cortes accorded them on October 1, 1936, against the onslaught of the Moslem Moors, the Italians, and the anti-Catholic Germans who committed the barbarous crime of Guernica. Moving from right to left, we come to the left bourgeois Republicans—consisting of Azaña's party, Martínez Barrio's party, and the Catalan left—who represent the views of the intellectuals and the middle class of shopkeepers and small peasants, and then to the right Socialists—whose leader, Indalecio Prieto, is himself a prominent Bilbao industrialist—the left Socialists, the Communists, and the Anarchists. The Popular Front, accordingly, is a coalition of capitalist and anti-capitalist groups. This marriage is not one of convenience. It rather reveals with exciting clarity the essence of the Spanish struggle. The Basque Catholics are fighting Franco because he has announced himself in favor of a strongly centralized government. He stated in an interview with Roy Howard of the Scripps-Howard papers that he would not tolerate Catalonian autonomy, and the Basques have always assumed that he would destroy their free status. And although the Basque Nationalist Party is essentially bourgeois, yet it, as well as the left Republicans, are allied with the radical proletariat and peasantry because they realize that Spain's past rulers were a hopelessly unintelligent lot who had brought the country to the brink of economic and political ruin.

From the domestic point of view the struggle in Spain is a contest between the forces of darkness, who are ready to sacrifice the country in order to save their feudal system, and all those who feel that the only hope for a prosperous and happy Spain lies in rebuilding Spain on a new basis. Torn between the alternative of a rotten social structure based on absentee landlordism and a new economy with many Socialist features, the forward-looking capitalists chose the latter after the recalcitrance of the reactionaries in the first five years of the republic had made a middle-of-the-road solution impossible. The best bourgeois minds of Spain support the Loyalists because they love their country and their liberty. Franco and fascism would destroy both.

During the two Azaña administrations the Spanish liberal bourgeoisie tried, with as little offense as possible to the economic royalists, to initiate some changes which might improve material conditions under capitalism and start Spain on the road to progress. They were stopped at every step by the Francos. It was indeed in the midst of just such a period of mild bourgeois reform that Franco rose up to smash the republic. The enlightened bourgeoisie's very existence depended on the success of Azaña's cautious program. It would have helped the small farmer, the merchants, and the industrialists. But the landlords in agrarian Spain were protecting only themselves—and doing that badly. Accordingly, when Franco started the civil war, the progressive capitalist elements had little choice. Franco had rejected them. The Socialists and Communists had not only tolerated but even supported them. Azaña, Martínez Barrio, the Basque Catholics, and other propertied groups are sure today that a fascist victory would safeguard Spain for medievalism and poverty, whereas the triumph of the Loyalists, even though it might ultimately inconvenience Spanish capitalism, would benefit Spain. The forward-looking Spanish bourgeoisie, in other words, is likewise a split personality. But its nationalism dominates its class interests, especially since those class interests would not be served by the political intrenchment of the landlords. The owning classes of Spain are on both sides of the barricades. For the sake of a happier Spain, one part of the bourgeoisie has made itself the willing confederate of the proletariat. In this respect the Spanish civil war is very different from the Russian civil war.

Largo Caballero, the Socialist leader, became Prime

Minister on September 4, 1936. This signified that the left Republicans were becoming less important. Socialistic trends acquired greater momentum. When the civil war broke out, many landlords and big business men in Loyalist territory fled, or were hurriedly tried and executed as fascist sympathizers, or were murdered by peasants in retaliation for years of poverty and subjugation. Their properties were thereupon confiscated. The confiscation, however, was not always orderly or conducted by state authorities. Often the peasants, united in the Casa del Pueblo, or People's House, took the land and subdivided it among themselves, or worked it collectively. In the cities hotels, department stores, large commercial enterprises, factories, and means of transportation were sequestered by powerful trade unions like the Socialist-controlled U. G. T. (Union of General Workers) or the Anarcho-Syndicalist C. N. T. (National Confederation of Workers), or by the several political parties, or by departments of the government. Through this chaos one tendency, however, was clear: the immediate result of the outbreak of hostilities was a blow to capitalism in Spain. Franco made this social revolution. The expropriated capitalists should file their complaints with the rebels. But for the insurrection the Republicans might have plodded along in power for years. Even a Socialist government might have hesitated to take very radical measures. But what failed to happen in years of peace took place in the first three months of war under the impact of Franco's attack on the legitimate government.

Nevertheless, the numerous small capitalist farmers were spared, as were petty shopkeepers and similar enterprises. Formally, the sequestration of capitalist property was a war measure against political enemies of the Loyalists. Yet formalities do not count where the social implications are so obvious. Socialism has made great strides in Loyalist Spain. Capitalism, nevertheless, persists, and it is not the policy of the government to crush it. Indeed, the Communist Party has printed posters urging the protection of the small proprietor in village and city, and other radical parties have conducted propaganda to the same end. While capitalism persists, the left Republicans have a part to play in the political life of Spain. But it is not a leading part. The participation of the bourgeois parties in the Loyalist government is also a symbol. To capitalists in fascist Spain, and to the outside world, it is intended as an indication that Valencia has no plan now of setting up

a soviet state or a Communist regime after victory in the civil war.

What will happen in Spain when hostilities end will depend on circumstances. The attitude of the bourgeois powers and of the Soviet Union will be a decisive factor. The extent of the ruination and destruction consequent upon the civil war will be another consideration. Experiments which might arouse the hostility of certain classes may not be regarded as conducive to reconstruction. In Soviet Russia economic distress resulting from intervention and civil war forced Lenin to introduce the New Economic Policy, which was a concession to capitalism. There are no perfect analogies in history; yet what the Bolsheviks did may serve as a precedent for Spain. The length of the civil war will determine many a social policy when it is over.

The active formulators of Loyalist policy are, and probably for some time to come will be, the Socialists, Communists, and Anarcho-Syndicalists. The Socialist Party counted approximately 75,000 members when the civil war commenced, but there were 1,200,000 Socialist trade unionists in the U. G. T., which was strong in both city and village. The Socialists were divided into right and left wings, the first representing a reformist or gradualist tendency and the latter a more radical one. Yet neither wing was ever anti-Communist or anti-Moscow as other Socialist and Labor parties are. Moreover, the experience of the early years of the republic converted numerous moderates to a revolutionary attitude, and the civil war did the rest. While old and sometimes personal antagonisms may persist between right- and left-wing Socialists, the party is today more united than ever, and it has been found that many a former right-winger cooperates more enthusiastically with the government, and what is equally significant, with the Communists, than some left-wingers.

The liaison between Socialists and Communists is intimate. In March, 1936, the Communist Party in Spain had 20,000 members. A month later it had 50,000. Today it numbers several hundred thousand in Loyalist Spain alone. The record of its fighting units at the front has given it much prestige. At one time the Fifth Regiment, which was really an army corps consisting of some 25,000 to 30,000 soldiers, Communists all, and including artillery, armored tanks, and the like, practically held the front around Madrid. This and similar circumstances have attracted to the party many Spaniards whom the civil war brought into

active public life for the first time. The virility of the Communist Party and the unity within it have also acted as a lodestone to left-wing Socialists, and a number of these adhered to the Communist Party in December, 1936. When this proved irritating to Socialist leaders, the Communists, practicing the self-effacement which has characterized their work ever since hostilities began, discouraged such persons from entering their ranks. The Communists have not advertised their strength. They have avoided every stand that might disrupt the Popular Front or irritate their political rivals among the Loyalists. When it developed that party armies interfered with good military discipline the Communists set the example by disbanding the Fifth Regiment. They subordinate all else to victory in the war. The Socialists take the same view. In Catalonia the Socialists and Communists have amalgamated into one party called the P. S. U. C. The Socialist and Communist youth organizations of Spain merged more than a year ago, and the fusion of all Spanish Socialists and Communists into a unified body finds an increasing number of protagonists.

The relation between the Communists and Anarchists, however, has lacked this harmony. In the minds of naive people, and of some statesmen, anarchism and communism are identical. But their philosophies, if not their millennial aims, are poles apart, and their methods are diametrically opposed. The Communists believe in strict discipline and action by masses to compel acceptance of their program. Unless it is forced upon them, they reject violence except in the ultimate attempt to seize power. Anarchists, on the other hand, believe in no subordination of the individual to his group and in sporadic terror. Hating the existing capitalist system no less than the Communists, they may destroy prominent persons or physical objects more to give expression to that hatred than to achieve a practical goal. The Communists do not condemn government as such; they merely prefer their own, whereas the Anarchists, seeing the evils of governments which oppress them, hold that all governments are inherently bad, including one which they might set up themselves.

The Anarchist movement has a long history in Spain. For decades the Russian Bakunin was better known and more widely accepted in Catalonia and Andalusia than was the German Marx. In the past Spanish Anarchists have refused to cooperate with Socialists or Communists, whom

they regard as reactionary. Important strikes were sometimes broken by too precipitate or too violent Anarchist action. Rumors that minor Anarchist leaders could be and had been bought by manufacturers acquired wide currency. The hostility between Anarchists and Marxists was considerable.

The Anarchists hailed the founding of the republic but refused to establish any contact with even its most radical supporters. True to their principles, they refrained from participating in elections or sending delegates to the Cortes. In 1934 and 1936, however, occasions did arise when Anarchists threw some voting strength to a Republican parliamentary candidate who was in danger of being defeated by a reactionary, and when Franco started his rebellion, the F. A. I. (Federation of the Anarchists of Iberia) and the C. N. T., the trade-union organization guided by the F. A. I., immediately joined the Loyalists. The Spanish Anarchist movement is deeply revolutionary. Most of its adherents are workingmen and poor peasants, and no other alignment was to have been expected. In the first days of the revolt Anarchists bravely stormed the Franco garrisons in Barcelona, and quickly suppressed the mutiny.

The Anarchists became the allies of the Popular Front, but they were not peaceful bedfellows. It was frequently stated in Spain during the early months of the civil war that many fascists and Franco friends who had been unable to escape from Loyalist territory entered the F. A. I. or C. N. T. not only for self-protection but also to commit acts which would disrupt Loyalist unity and discredit the Loyalist cause. That the Anarchist organizations opened their doors wide when the rebellion started is a fact. Indeed, whereas the Socialist trade unions made admission doubly difficult in order to shut out questionable characters who might strive to join to save their skins, the C. N. T. is known to have coerced people to come in. The infiltration into Anarchist bodies of anti-Loyalists may therefore have influenced Anarchist policy to some extent, but if it did it merely accentuated an existing tendency. The moment the civil war started, the Anarchists, if they had had their way, would have summarily killed off all persons in any manner connected with the old social order and have uprooted every capitalist institution. Among the protagonists of the old order they would certainly have included most bourgeois left Republicans, even though these were

staunchly anti-Franco and were fighting as well as they could on the front. They would have expropriated not only the big landlords and large industrialists who favored the rebels but also the petty farmers and small storekeepers, who, though capitalists, were pro-Loyalist because they had suffered under the regime of feudal landlordism and rapacious industrialism.

Actually the Anarchists carried out as much as possible of this program. In Catalonia, their stronghold, and elsewhere too when possible, they confiscated hotels, factories, bus-lines, taxi companies, etc., and operated them in defiance of the government's endeavors to coordinate business activity. Commercial establishments were placed under the direction of employees' or workers' committees which often mismanaged them and reduced the output through their lack of executive ability, when the prosecution of the war required maximum production. In villages where peasants were joyfully dividing sequestered estates among themselves, the Anarchists, occasionally at the butt of the rifle, insisted on the wiping out of individual holdings and the collective cultivation of land.

Moreover, when justice, as administered by the government, appeared too slow and cautious to the Anarchists, they did not hesitate to take matters into their own hands. If there were really fascists in Anarchist ranks, such arbitrary procedure enabled them, under cover of darkness, to serve their own ends by doing away with friends of the republic or, by firing off their rifles and throwing hand grenades in the dark, to sow panic and create an impression of chaos.

At the same time Anarchist military units did not acquit themselves too well at the front. In the early months of the war, of course, all militiamen ran away from the enemy on the slightest excuse. They were bad soldiers—because they were not soldiers at all. But the Anarchists sinned most frequently in this respect. The Loyalist army began with very few officers, and the few were untrained. Some were politically unreliable, a factor which undoubtedly accounted for a number of military defeats. But whereas many units accepted the officers sent them and attempted to introduce some semblance of military discipline, Anarchist units were ruled by soldiers' committees. Whether a particular formation would execute the commander's orders and go into battle was decided by a general vote and often in the negative. Everything was democratic. Ralph Bates,

the able British novelist and authority on Spain, tells how he saw Durutti, the beloved Anarchist leader who would have had the rank of general, standing somewhere about hundredth in line with pot and pan waiting for his lunch while he was in command of thousands of Anarchist soldiers at the Aragon front. This was typical of an approach which destroyed much of the value of the Anarchists' presence on the battlefield.

The Anarchists were a problem and sometimes a nuisance, but their profound hold on large sections of the population, their revolutionary zeal, and the devotion of their overwhelming majority to the Loyalist cause were a real, and an even greater potential, asset. They were of the flesh and blood of anti-fascism, and it remained for them and the other anti-fascists to find a *modus vivendi*. They themselves wanted to belong. At the end of September and the beginning of October, 1936, they began to insist on being taken into the government. No, since they worshiped phrases, they demanded the abolition of the Cabinet and the creation of a "Counsel of Defense" with strong Anarchist representation. They would then not have entered a "government"—they were opposed to governments and Anarchists would not be ministers. Subsequently they dropped this make-believe and plainly asked ministerial portfolios for their leaders. Within the Popular Front parties this aroused opposition. It was contended that the Anarchists lacked a sense of responsibility, that they could not control their followers, and that they would not cooperate whole-heartedly. Yet the other view prevailed, and in November, 1936, the Caballero Cabinet was reorganized to include four Anarchist ministers. The popular Catalan Anarchist leader, Garcia Oliver, became Minister of Justice. Many Anarchists made an honest effort to collaborate. The realities of office had a sobering effect. A number of Anarchist leaders had always been aware of the preeminence of the front. This applied especially to Durutti, who spent most of his time with the army and helped to instil military discipline in his Anarchist brigades. Unfortunately, he was killed at Madrid in December.

The left Republicans, Socialists, and Communists saw the problem as one of focusing Anarchist attention on the front. A social revolution was implicit in the civil war. Capitalism had already received serious blows, and the direction of social trends in the future had been established. To push this too far might mean to destroy it.

Lenin did not collectivize in 1918. What good would farm collectives and socialized industry be if Franco won? To the peasant, fascism is a very tangible evil. He identifies it with landlords, political bosses, and oppressive, reactionary government. The struggle against these arouses his enthusiasm. It has already brought him concrete benefits. By May, 1937, seven and a half million acres of estate lands had been confiscated and distributed. The peasant will fight like a lion to prevent the landowners from returning to power. If the peasants themselves choose to cultivate their estates collectively, there can be no objection. But to superimpose the collective system when the farmers resist it—as they have in many localities—is unwise. In Russia, too, during the civil war of 1918-21, the peasants generally sided with the Soviets and enabled the Bolsheviks to defeat the whites for the negative reason that the whites would have brought back the landlords. Yet partly because all Spanish Anarchists had not been converted to this point of view and partly because of the ancient rivalry between Marxists and Anarchists, the latter continued to concentrate much of their attention on the rear. In January and February, 1937, three charges against the Anarchists were heard: that their brigades at the front often refused to fight, that munitions from the inadequate government resources placed in their hands for fighting Franco were retained in cities behind the lines for what some Anarchists regarded as an inevitable clash with Communists and Socialists, and, finally, that by compulsory collectivization, Anarchist groups had forced peasants in villages of Catalonia and the Levant provinces to take up arms against the authorities. On the other hand, Anarchists could get things done when they wanted, and their aid in transportation and in mobilizing food and other supplies was frequently appreciated by government departments. At the same time, the ability of the Valencia government to centralize authority in its hands gradually increased, and arbitrary acts by Anarchists consequently tended to decrease. Willy-nilly, therefore, there was more Anarchist collaboration with the government.

A large irreconcilable and non-cooperative Anarchist faction remained, and especially in Catalonia it was frequently able to dominate the situation. This faction found comfort and aid in the Trotskyists of the P. O. U. M., which was formed by the Workers' and Peasants' Party, led by Maurin, and by the Trotskyist Communist opposi-

tion, led by Andres Nin. The P. O. U. M. refused to identify itself with Trotsky's Fourth International and was prepared, despite the Trotskyist hostility to the United Front, to participate in a Popular Front government in Catalonia. But in its general antagonism to collaboration with liberal-bourgeois anti-fascists and in its insistence on immediate and complete social revolution (these two positions go hand in hand), the P. O. U. M. is essentially Trotskyist. Perhaps the sharpest issue was agricultural collectivization. The Trotskyists had opposed it twelve years after the successful Soviet revolution in Russia, but insisted on it in the midst of the Spanish civil war when victory was still in doubt, and when the socialization of farming was sure to weaken the pro-Loyalist sentiments of many peasants whose help was essential to military success. The Trotskyists were strongest in Barcelona. Elsewhere, although they had confiscated some hotels, buildings, and private automobiles in Madrid and other centers, they were never very numerous. They were, however, well led and vociferous. They leaned on the Anarchists, and because Anarchist political thinking was often naive, could influence Anarchist action.

When the war broke out, the two stock Trotskyist arguments militated against the popularity of the P. O. U. M. One argument was against popular fronts, the other against the Soviet Union. In Spain, particularly after July, 1936, the Popular Front had become a symbol. It represented the unity without which fascism could not be vanquished. The Trotskyist opposition to the Popular Front accordingly found a more and more hostile reception among the masses.

The people likewise frowned on anti-Sovietism. Even before the broad stream of airplanes and munitions began to flow from the Soviet Union to Spain, Russia was very popular with all anti-fascists. I arrived in Spain in the middle of September, 1936, and took the night train from Valencia to Madrid. All the coaches were crowded with soldiers, but I managed to find a bench on which I lay down and fell asleep. In the middle of the night I was awakened by a tap on the shoulder, and when I opened my eyes six militiamen with rifles stood over me. Their commander, wearing the red-and-black silk neckerchief which marked him an Anarchist, politely asked me for identification papers. I showed him the safe conduct I had received from the Spanish embassy in Paris. He wanted something more.

I showed him my pass from the Valencia provincial government. This too did not suffice.

"Are you an Italian?" he asked.

I said "No."

"Are you German?"

"No."

Then I drew out my passport and said, "I am a North American."

He said, "Fascist or anti-fascist?" I took the passport from him, opened it, and said, "You see this? It's a Soviet visa," and pointed to the sickle and hammer. Then I opened another page and showed him a second Soviet visa. Then I opened another page and showed him still another. At this he raised his hand in the clenched-fist sign and said "Salud, camarada!" This from an Anarchist at a time when Russia had only sent food, clothing, and industrial raw materials. A few months later Russia was beloved by all Spaniards who knew that Soviet aid had saved the Loyalist cause, and everybody knew it because there are no secrets in Spain. Trotskyist membership dropped accordingly. It had become impossible in Spain to criticize Stalin as a counter-revolutionary and nationalist.

The combination of Trotskyists and dissident Anarchists continued, nevertheless, to give the Loyalist government considerable anxiety and trouble. Quiet assassinations, the seizure of arms shipments intended for the front, and open outbreaks like that in Barcelona in May, 1937, have diverted the attention of the Valencia Cabinet from its chief task, the military one. But the left Republicans, Socialists, and Communists now hold that the secret of their relationship with the Anarchists lies in a firm policy by a strong government which will preclude any party or group from attempting to carry out in any part of Loyalist Spain a program opposed to that of the central government. This explains the formation of the Juan Negrin Cabinet in May, 1937, to succeed Largo Caballero. The Anarchists are now expected to behave, and good behavior will presumably teach them the wisdom of co-operation. Many Anarchists, perhaps the majority, already see the desirability of an aggressive Popular Front policy. More will be converted to it.

5. THE QUESTION OF ATROCITIES

These difficulties, and the internal political situation in Loyalist Spain generally, are the clue to the question of

atrocities which has received so much prominence in the press. In like manner the political constellation in the Franco country explains the murders and executions which have taken place there. Atrocities have been committed by both sides. Civil war is a climax of factional hatreds. Yet it exacerbates these hatreds. The two contending sides become more sharply demarcated than ever and each openly avows its intention of destroying the other. With passions thus loosed, and especially where volatile, temperamental Spaniards are concerned, much bloodshed is inevitable. This is what makes foreign mediation or a truce especially difficult to arrange. The Spanish civil war has been no friendly picnic. Hosts of marked Loyalists lived in Franco territory, and innumerable partisans of Franco remained within reach of the Loyalists. These could stab their respective enemies in the back; each party in the struggle, therefore, sought to make them harmless. When the rebel army converged on Madrid, General Mola, who was at that time in charge of the operation, frivolously announced that he was approaching from different points of the compass with four columns of troops. A "fifth column" of active rebel sympathizers inside the capital, he stated, would greet and assist him when he entered it. What would be more natural, then, than for the Loyalist government immediately to search out the suspected members of this "fifth column" and destroy them. Franco did similar things. When he took a town or village, his special police quickly coralled men and women who, according to informants, had borne arms in the Loyalist ranks, trade-union members who were sure to be hostile to him and who might engage in sabotage in factories, and peasants who, by word or deed, manifested their unfriendly attitude. He made short shrift of them without going carefully into individual cases. Nevertheless, Douglas Jerrold, a Catholic apologist for Franco, says in the April, 1937, *American Review*: "There have been no atrocities on the Nationalist side . . . there was no need for them." It is good that he writes this way, for no one now will believe anything else he says.

There are very telling differences between Loyalist atrocities and rebel atrocities. Rebel atrocities have been more numerous for a simple reason: there were more Loyalist sympathizers in rebel territory than rebel sympathizers in Loyalist territory. Many reactionaries, landlords, industrialists, and fascists were forewarned and escaped before the insurrection commenced, or took advantage of the chaos of

its early weeks to flee to districts where Franco held sway or go abroad. But peasants and workingmen usually do not have the funds or the private means of transportation for escape, and the idea, indeed, would rarely occur to them. The millions of plain people who thus remained exposed to Franco vengeance far outnumbered those pro-rebels who fell into the hands of the Loyalists.

Civil war is by definition an attack on established government. It weakens that government, and this was especially true of the weak Madrid government in the summer of 1936, deprived of an army and the major portion of its police force and supported by divergent groups which it could not fully control if they chose to resist control. Practically all Loyalist atrocities were perpetrated by individuals or groups acting on their own initiative without benefit of courts. The period in which such arbitrary acts were possible lasted for several months. Gradually, however, the authority and police power of the central government grew. It prohibited lawless acts of terror, and the Loyalist press and radio made propaganda against them. After a while offenders were punished. Rebels, spies, and others of course continued to be arrested by the authorities, but they were given fair public trials, and opportunities were granted for appeals against sentences. Normal methods of administering justice succeeded the anarchy of the early period. Loyalist atrocities were thus a concomitant of the disorder that resulted when a small but powerful minority sought to upset a none-too-powerful but popular government. But the number of excesses steadily tapered off, and before the civil war was six months old, atrocities as a phenomenon had ceased to exist in Loyalist Spain. This does not mean that isolated assassinations did not take place.

With Franco, however, atrocities have been continuous and must remain so. They are not an accident but a permanent policy, a weapon to suppress opposition. Yet that opposition invariably recurs where it has presumably been stamped out. Franco foresaw this possibility from the very beginning. At Tangier on July 29, 1936, he declared to a correspondent of the *London News Chronicle* that he would "save Spain from Marxism at whatever cost."

"That means that you will have to shoot half of Spain?" the correspondent queried.

Franco replied: "I repeat, at whatever cost."

The rebel terror has taken the form of individual shoot-

ings, small group shootings, and mass executions. The illustrations are legion. Writing in the pro-Franco New York *Evening Journal* of May 5, 1937, H. R. Knickerbocker said: "Going to the front one day near Santa Olalla we passed five old women just killed by a fascist fighting squad, their bodies lying in a ditch. They were peasant women of the better class, cleanly dressed and averaging about sixty years of age. . . . A little later, in the village of Alcorcon, we came across the bodies of two youthful members of the red militia, bound back to back with wire, and burned alive." But leading a revolt of minorities against the people, Franco has had to introduce a special terroristic feature—wholesale atrocities. The killing of approximately 2,000 Loyalists by machine-gun in the bull ring of Badajoz has been accepted as a historical fact. When the rebels captured Toledo, the government had succeeded in evacuating two hospitals but found no time to empty the third. Moors, officered by Spaniards, approached this hospital. The chief physician barred the way. He was felled by a revolver shot and then the rebel soldiers went from ward to ward hand-grenading the wounded in their beds. Later they killed all the doctors and nurses too. This is an authenticated event which has been related in all its details in the British House of Commons by members of Parliament who collected the information. Such mass murders are not isolated episodes. The bombing from airplanes and shelling of purely civilian sections of Madrid have gone on month after month when no military objective could be achieved. This is the major atrocity not only of the Spanish civil war but of modern times. The annihilation of the Catholic population of Guernica in the Basque country by German airplanes and the shelling of Almeria by German warships are too well known to require repetition.

Such large-scale extermination reflects Franco's political philosophy and his future prospects. The Loyalists, too, could bomb civilians. It requires no great art to drop missiles on the excellent target furnished by a large city. In fact, there has been pressure on the Loyalist government to retaliate for such deeds as the continued bombing of Madrid by doing likewise. The government has refused to yield to this pressure. Its planes have probably killed civilians who lived in the immediate neighborhood of munitions factories, military airdromes, or railway stations which were the objects of attack. It is impossible to direct an aerial bomb to an

exact address. But these cases have been few, and in no instance have Loyalist pilots deliberately taken a civilian target, whereas Franco's airmen and gunners have done so repeatedly. There must be a reason for this distinction between the behavior of the two factions. The Loyalist government confidently expects when the war is over to govern all of Spain with the consent of the governed. And it has no desire unnecessarily to embitter parts of the population. Franco knows, however, that if he wins, he can rule only by means of the iron heel and foreign bayonets. In such circumstances the opinion of the masses does not count. He cannot expect to gain their favor anyway. The terror he engenders by indiscriminate shootings makes for the "peace and order" which observers have noted in Franco territory. It facilitates the task of administration.

6. FRANCO'S DILEMMA AND THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME

Franco's problem of finding a sufficient number of Spaniards ready to fight for him and carry him to victory remains insoluble. Without Hitler and Mussolini, Franco falls. When the question of taking foreign troops out of Spain arose, John T. Whitaker, the New York *Herald Tribune's* veteran correspondent, telegraphed from Rome (May 23, 1937): "The moment for such withdrawal has not come yet, it is believed here, because without foreign support Franco's forces would succumb to the Spanish Loyalists." And further, "If Spain were left to the Spaniards, the Loyalist Valencia government would win." Yet Franco has received infinitely more munitions from abroad than the Loyalists and has enjoyed in addition the support of at least 90,000 German and Italian trained soldiers, whereas the government's International Brigade never consisted of more than 20,000 individual volunteers.

Despite the fact that the fascist powers shipped whole regiments to Franco, their presence did not enable him to register very sensational gains. Early in February, 1937, insurgents captured Malaga, the southern port, and Italy took full credit for the victory. According to statements in the Italian press, relayed to the New York *Times* on February 10 by its Rome representative, "The backbone of insurgent General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano's army is made up of 16,000 Italian soldiers who landed at Cadiz early in January. Sixty German bombing planes also are reported to be participating in the operations. It is noteworthy that this report is issued by the official Italian news

agency, Stefani." But Malaga is very far from the center of Loyalist military activity, and like Toledo in September, 1936, it was surrendered practically without a serious struggle, thanks to inefficiency and perhaps also to treachery in the government's General Staff. In March, however, when several Italian divisions massed on the Guadalajara front and attempted completely to encircle Madrid, they were decisively routed by the Loyalists in the now famous battle of Brihuega. The government troops took 2,000 Italian prisoners and captured tremendous stores of Italian army equipment, as well as official documents which originated in Rome. Some of the prisoners declared that when the transports took them from Italian harbors they thought they were going to Ethiopia. Others had been in East Africa and facsimiles of photographs of naked Abyssinian women found on them, together with voluminous pictorial evidence of Italian intervention in Spain, were included in a Valencia White Book. The raw militiamen of yesterday had routed Mussolini's legions. Nor did General Mola have an easy task in attacking Bilbao, although his army was heavily reinforced by Germans and Italians and supported by scores of foreign planes, whereas the Basque defenders had no airplanes for many weeks and were very short of guns, munitions, and food.

If Spain were hermetically sealed and non-intervention made a reality, the legitimate government would win within a few months. Foreign help has weighed more with the rebels than the Loyalists. If foreigners fighting on both sides were withdrawn, the advantage would be on the side of the Loyalists. That is why Italy, which has larger stakes in the Mediterranean than Germany, hesitates to forsake her role as invader of Spain. Spain is a phase of a looming struggle between the British and Italian empires which may be the feature of the next decade of European history. Mussolini is loath to admit defeat. Yet he may be compelled to, for the Spanish civil war has revealed the weaknesses as well as the strength of the fascist countries. Hitler and Mussolini were in a position to dispatch invaluable assistance to Franco, quickly and without seeking approval, and then cynically deny that they were doing so. The dictators knew their minds. That was their advantage. But Spain has served to show that it would be easier to call the fascists' bluff than was formerly believed. This has been their loss. The fighting in Spain indicates that German and Italian airplanes as well as pilots are inferior

to Soviet airplanes and pilots. This fact, attested by innumerable eyewitnesses of air battles over Madrid and other fronts, has been accepted by the war offices of European countries and has entered into their calculations regarding the imminence of a European war. Moreover, the disastrous defeat of the Italian divisions at Brihuega undermined Italian military prestige in Europe, and experts began to mark down the value of Mussolini's army. In Paris, London, and Moscow it is therefore hoped that Spain may have taught Berlin and Rome a lesson in caution. They have seen the shortcomings of their armaments and the high quality of those that might be used by at least one nation against them. Perhaps, too, the Germans were disappointed with their Italian allies, and vice versa. Having tested their forces in Spain, the fascist powers may not be as ready to provoke the democracies as they were before the Spanish civil war started. The cause of peace is advanced.

With their usual contempt for democracies and "reds," Germany and Italy believed that Franco would easily overwhelm the Loyalists and establish a fascist Spain. In the summer of 1936 they were sure that a few airplane squadrons, some guns and rifles would produce a rebel victory. Disillusioned but undaunted, they later did not doubt that the support of tens of thousands of German and Italian troops would mean that Franco could march through the country and sweep the foe before him. But when this failed to materialize, when indeed whole Italian divisions suffered defeat, the problem assumed a different aspect. Berlin and Rome now realized that they had undertaken more than they had bargained for, that this was a major task which was beginning to drain their resources. It is estimated that the first seven months of the civil war cost Germany \$200,000,000. And when the wounded started coming back to Germany from the Spanish fronts, Germans began to murmur against Hitler's Spanish adventure. The Reichswehr leaders had always opposed Nazi intervention in Spain as too dangerous and costly. Now the layman who was missing his butter and eggs and paying more for all commodities in order presumably that Germany might have guns, began to wonder why he should be pulling in his belt so that Franco could get those guns. Social discontent, already a significant phenomenon, grew.

Similar sentiments were noted in Italy. John T. Whitaker, writing from Rome to the New York *Herald Tribune*

of May 23, 1937, described the average Italian's reaction thus: "The Italians, however, are frequently worried about the situation. The man in the street hears that Italy has sent 70,000 men to Spain and has spent almost two billion lire (\$105,000,000), and the information does not appeal to him. After the two-year financial strain caused by Italy's war with Ethiopia, the Italian people see in the Spanish strife a deadlock which may last many more months."

Franco's foreign aid, a strain upon the giver yet inadequate for the receiver, has, to make matters even worse, produced friction in the rebel camp. The Hitler-Mussolini-Franco triangle does not live happily together. The German staff in Spain has on occasions insisted upon one plan of attack and Franco on another. The Italians have sometimes proposed still a third. There have been bickerings and quarrels, and once, according to reliable reports, a pitched battle with many casualties took place near the Guadarrama Mountains between Nazi troops, taught at home to believe in their racial superiority, and black Moors. As H. R. Knickerbocker, who has spent many months with Franco's army, put it in the *New York Evening Journal* of May 1, 1937: "The Germans in Spain despise the Italians and detest the Spaniards. The Italians hate the Germans and loathe the Spaniards. The Spaniards abhor both Italians and Germans and everybody is sick of war."

These disagreements make Franco's prospects look even worse than they were originally. To help him is like pouring water into a bottomless barrel. This fact has apparently impressed itself on Hitler, and Germany, anxious, too, despite the "Berlin-Rome axis" not to offend Great Britain excessively (England is fast rearming), has grown cooler toward Franco. Mussolini is more deeply involved, and he has attempted, sometimes by provoking bombing incidents, to rekindle Berlin's zeal. The prospect cannot seem bright to Il Duce—70,000 Italian soldiers, he must say to himself, have not enabled the rebels to win. Franco will apparently need 100,000 additional Italians for a prolonged period—perhaps a year—to crush the Loyalists. Can Italy afford this outlay? To render less assistance means merely to drag out the war. Yet to render enough for victory may bring England and France into the conflict. For these powers could scarcely countenance the intrenchment of an army of 200,000 Italians in Spain.

Logic, accordingly, would demand that Italy retire, and this may indeed be history's way of writing "Finis" to the

Spanish civil war. But there is also a possibility that the fascist dictators, having failed to help Franco win, may give him sufficient support to keep him from losing. If Rome and Berlin each sent twenty-five airplanes a month—and these could easily be flown in, for there is no air patrol of Spain—Franco could continue to fight for a year unless revolts completely demolished his rear guard. This method would be a gamble on some development in the international or Spanish situation which might turn the tide in favor of the rebels. The slaughter and destruction would go on and recuperation would be delayed. This epitomizes the fate of the classes which Franco represents: they can ruin Spain but not rule it. If "rule" means to govern to the advantage of the people, Spain has been misruled for centuries.

Spain will have no peace until the elements now fighting Franco are victorious. The possible course of the civil war must be judged not by any morning's sensational telegram but in the larger perspective of historical analogies and fundamental trends. Napoleon sent gigantic armies into Spain, hundreds of thousands of men. He devoted years to an attempt to subdue Spain. He failed. That is an ill omen for Hitler and Mussolini. Between 1914 and 1918 Germany won most of the battles. In the end, split by internal social difficulties and faced with an economically superior combination of allies, she lost the war. The map is no exact mirror of the military situation in Spain. In December Franco was in the suburbs of Madrid, yet on the verge of defeat. Not the amount of territory conquered, but the material, human, and moral resources of the opposing camps will determine the issue of the conflict. The question is not simply who pushed whom back in today's fighting but what the victory, if it was Franco's, cost him in men and arms and whether it demoralized the Loyalists or taught them the need of greater discipline and political cohesion.

Franco's resources are limited. He will have first what he gets from abroad. He lacks money, and as Mr. Knickerbocker said in Hearst's *New York Evening Journal*, "he needs man-power." Knickerbocker stated on May 3, 1937, that "General Franco has refrained from recruiting heavily [because] he could not rely on the rank and file of peasants and workers to the same degree as the reds could with their promises of heaven on earth for the common man."

Thanks to this "promise of heaven on earth for the

common man," the Loyalists are forging a mass army whose fighting qualities, officers, and equipment steadily improve. They enjoy, moreover, the benefits of a vast financial reserve which, according to a statement made to me by Gabriel Franco, Minister of Finance in Madrid on April 6, 1936, then amounted to 2,227,000,000 pesetas in gold and 686,000,000 in silver, and was not much smaller in September of the same year.

The Loyalists hold Barcelona, Spain's greatest metallurgical center, which after numerous difficulties of a technical as well as political nature is beginning to produce a widening flow of munitions. Additional strength likewise accrues to the Loyalists from the elimination of old army officers whose devotion to the anti-fascist cause is doubtful. The presence of these men in the military apparatus has been responsible for defeats and difficulties at the front. Finally, the smoothing out of dissension among parties unalterably committed to the struggle against fascism would give the Loyalist army greater striking power. The internal political situation is a complicated one. Yet the problems it presents need not resist solution interminably. The outstanding fact is that the Valencia government's reserves of strength are far from used up. Indeed, they have barely been scratched. The Loyalists have not yet exploited all possibilities of improving their position. Time, therefore, plays into their hands. As the months go by, not exhaustion but an intensification of effort, greater firmness of purpose, and warmer popular enthusiasm characterize the legitimate government's activities. It lost much time getting started, whereas the rebels, having taken the initiative, were early prepared to deliver a series of quick blows. Franco has lost that advantage. His situation becomes increasingly difficult. The government, on the other hand, is continually opening up new pockets of energy. It feels certain of ultimate success.

The outcome of the civil war will have far-reaching repercussions on international affairs and on world social developments. But intertwined with these is the paramount issue—Spain's future. Will Spain lie prostrate, chained by oppressors and smothered in the ashes of her cities and the rivers of congealed blood that have been added to her former misery? Or will the Spanish nation rise revitalized, fatigued but inspired by a new sense of self-confidence? For the first time in centuries the people themselves are shaping their fate in the civil war. They will insist on

doing so when it is ended. The social upheaval that accompanies the fighting has caused a ferment that will not soon stop. Millions who thought of themselves as akin to pack animals, robots that dug the earth or tended machines, have now become keenly aware of the role they can and should play in molding their life and that of their country. This realization, in a revolutionary era, is the psychological spark which releases endless quantities of physical and intellectual power for the task of national transformation. New strata of humanity, previously separated from light by a thin crust of aristocracy and plutocracy, are churned up to the surface and demand work and opportunity. Franco would have to stamp them back into the depths again.

Spain has been waiting, too patiently, for this awakening. She is rich in talent and natural resources, and can contribute much more than she has contributed to Europe and to mankind. The Loyalist leaders, especially Juan Negrin, grow excited and eloquent when they touch the subject of Spain's upbuilding under a new regime. Engineers will dam the rivers and spread life-giving waters over the sun-baked fields of Castile, Andalusia, and Extremadura to increase their crops and give more food, health, and education to a suffering peasantry. Railways and ports must be developed, mountains explored for mineral treasures, and known deposits so worked that the country as a whole and not a privileged few may benefit. The unspoiled, freshly upturned layers of society will draw new wealth from the earth. More industries will rise to employ the energies of the people and bring them comfort, pleasure, and leisure. Spain will come back into Europe and help to remake Europe.

When death ceases on the battlefield, a nation will be reborn. Only this could justify all the carnage. For Spain to revert to her feudal sleep would mock the dead and torture the living.



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